Increasing evidence supports that international trade enhances innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Since firms undertake cost reducing innovations, the increase in production pushes firms to innovate more. Compared to other oligopolistic competition models, we find a larger procompetitive effect of trade on innovation under this framework, and this effect is increasing the larger the elasticity of substitution between products.
Introduction
During the last three decades the volume of international trade has increased enormously, among developed countries since the 80's and extending to developing countries since the 90s. This increase in trade volumes is contemporaneous with several attempts to create regional integration agreements, as for example the European Union, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. These two related facts have motivated researchers to reopen the old debate in international trade about the consequences of trade liberalization for productivity and growth.
The literature on the effects of trade openness and trade liberalization on productivity growth is extensive. These papers focus on different mechanisms through which trade may have an impact on productivity and growth. Trade, for example, allows countries to exploit their current comparative advantage which could have ambiguous effects on productivity growth (Grossman and Helpman (1993) , Yo u n g (1991), Redding (1999) ); Trade gives access to new technologies and ideas that can make local R&D investments more productive (Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) , Grossman and Helpman (1993) ). Surprisingly only a few papers have studied how trade may have an effect on innovation and growth by increasing competition in local markets. The aim of this paper is to contribute to fill this gap by considering a model where the main channel through which trade has an impact on innovation and growth is the increase in competition.
In this paper, we stress the positive impact on economic growth of the procompetitive role of international trade focusing, on the strategic interaction among firms, and more precisely on how firms strategically interact in a Cournot context. The model builds on the early literature on international trade and strategic interaction developed by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) , and the more recent general equilibrium version by Leahy and Neary (2010) . In a two-symmetric-country economy with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties; each of these varieties is produced by an oligopoly under Cournot competition. As a consequence, when economies open to trade, it is not the mass of varieties that changes, but the number of firms competing within each variety. Each firm serves both markets the local and the foreign and the number of competitors has risen in both markets. Although the quantity produced per firm is reduced in each market, the total quantity produced per firm is larger in the open economy scenario. Since firms undertake cost-reducing innovations, innovation incentives depend positively on firms' size, as cost reductions apply to the number of produced units. As a consequence of an increase in the quantity produced, each firm invests more in innovation activities increasing productivity growth.
growth, as in Grossman and Helpman (1993) , Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) , Romer (1990) and Devereux and Lapham (1994) , give little space to competition because of the monopolistically competitive nature of markets which ignores strategic interaction across firms and the assumption that innovation is carried out by potential entrants. The recent literature on international trade and heterogeneous firms, pioneered by Melitz (2003) have used the monopolistic competition assumption to study the impact of trade liberalization on industry productivity and several papers have extended this framework to allow firms for technology upgrading (See Atkeson and Burstein (2010) , among others). 1 While this literature outlines an important mechanism through which competition may have an impact on plant and industry productivity growth (the selection effect) these papers cannot account for the recent empirical evidence, at firm and industry levels, suggesting that globalization has increased both product market competition, by reducing markups, and firm's R&D investments, leading to gains in aggregate productivity levels and productivity growth. 2 The Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition assumption leaves firms' mark-ups constant and therefore not affected by trade liberalization. 3 A new literature on competition and growth has been developed, in which incumbents are allowed to upgrade their own technologies and firms interact strategically with their competitors giving a more relevant place to competition on innovation (Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) , Peretto (1999) ). The latter considers an extension of Romer (1990) where firms undertake cost-reduction innovations and competeá la Bertrand instead of behaving monopolistically. Two interesting papers have used this set-up to study the effects of trade liberalization 1 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is another important paper in this literature. See Ederington and McCalman (2007) , Long, Raff, and Stahler (2009) and Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) for theoretical models studying the effects of trade liberalization on plant an industry productivity growth focusing on firm heterogeneity. Impullitti and Licandro (2010) extend the current paper on this direction. 2 The empirical literature on the relation between trade and innovation, as well as the competitive role of trade for innovation and productivity growth, has been booming recently. See Bloom, Draca, and Reenen (2011), Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2010) , Bustos (2011 ), Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2009 ), Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2009 ), Griffith, Harrison, and Simpson (2010 , Lileeva and Trefler (2010) , Pavcnik (2002) , Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) , among others.
3 Still it is possible to introduce non-constant mark-ups into a monopolistic competition set-up, by considering a quadratic utility function that derives linear demand systems (Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) ). This way of modelling, however, ignores strategic interaction among firms. Mark-ups are reduced because trade increases the elasticity of demand for a particular variety but this result clearly depends on the specific utility function considered. The advantage of introducing oligopoly is twofold: On the one hand, the effect of trade on innovation is mostly the result of a pure competition effect (the effect of the increase in the number of competitors in the firms' perceived elasticity of demand that is driven by the strategic interaction among firms), on the other hand, our result is valid for a broader set of utility functions.
Early attempts to study the impact of trade liberalization on innovation and on competition and growth: Peretto (2003) and Traca (2002) . The first one studies the case of North-North trade, showing that trade liberalization reduces both the global number of firms and R&D costs due to technological spillovers, increasing the incentives to innovate. The second one studies the case of trade between a small open developing economy and the developed world. Openness to trade has a different impact on innovation and growth depending on the initial productivity gap between both economies. The developing economy converges to the global innovation path only if the initial productivity gap is low enough.
The main results in the current paper are close to Peretto (2003) . However, Cournot competition turns out to be a more appropriate framework than Bertrand competition for modeling the pro-competitive effect of trade. As we show in a detailed comparison between both frameworks in section 4, 4 trade has a pro-competitive effect under Bertrand competition if both the number of close competitors is very small and the degree of substitutability among them is low. When the degree of substitutability across products is high enough, the pro-competitive effect of trade is nul, having negligible impacts on innovation and productivity growth. The extreme case is the one in which the goods are perfect substitutes, in which, trade has no impact on innovation and growth because firms are already pricing at marginal cost in equilibrium and trade does not induce any gain in competition. 5 However, it's difficult to imagine distributing US firms in very small sets of a few close competitors with a low degree of substitutability among the goods they produce. Indeed, such organization of producers is expected to select small sets of highly substitutable products.
Differently from Bertrand competition, under Cournot competition, the procompetitive effect of trade only requires a small number of competitors, allowing for a very high degree of substitutability among the goods they produce. This framework suggests that everything else being equal, trade has a positive effect on innovation and growth that is larger under Cournot competition than in Bertrand competition. Moreover, under Cournot competition, the pro-competitive effect of trade is larger the larger is the elasticity of substitution between subvarieties, being the largest one where all subvarieties are perfect substitutes, the case studied in de-tail in the paper. Under Bertrand competition, the pro-competitive effect of trade is declining for high values of the elasticity of substitution and is zero in the limit case where all subvarieties are perfect substitutes.
For the particular case studied in the paper, another advantage of this set-up relies on the fact that an increase in competition is modeled by an increase in the number of competitors offering the same product. 6 Notice that in this framework, other measures of competition like markups, market shares or market concentration reduce when the number of firms increases. Moreover, it is important to say that this paper studies the case of economic integration among similar economies where openness to trade intensifies competition within existing industries rather than opening opportunities to profit from comparative advantages, giving access to different goods produced abroad, something more frequent in the case of North-South trade. 7 Finally, Cournot competition is particularly suitable for the study of bilateral trade in industries whose firms supply homogeneous products, which, as pointed out by Bernhofen (1999) , turns out to be a main characteristic of R&D intensive industries like petrochemicals, machinery, medical and surgical equipment, telecommunications equipment and airlines among them. Griffith et al. (2010) finds that in the European Union the chemical industry, that is mostly characterized by homogeneous goods, was one of the most affected sectors by the Single Market Program.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in autarky and it analyzes the main forces driving growth. Section 3 goes through the open economy scenario with both free trade and costly trade in the case of two identical economies. In section 4, we discuss how the results change when we allow for different competition modes, pointing out the advantages of using the Cournot competition framework. In section 5 we conclude. 6 In Aghion et al. (2001) , competition is measured by the elasticity of substitution between different varieties. In our paper, an increase in the elasticity of substitution across varieties will increase R&D investments leading to productivity growth. However, as Koeniger and Licandro (2006) point out, the elasticity of substitution across varieties, is an element of the environment reflecting preferences (if we have different varieties of a final good) or technology (if we have different varieties of an intermediate good). They claim that changes in the elasticity of substitution results on different efficient allocations, which may be confounded with the associated change in competition. 7 Another important difference is the general equilibrium perspective adopted in this paper. Peretto (2003) and Traca (2002) consider strategic interaction within a monopolistic competition structure assuming that the number of firms is small enough to have some market power. However, this implies that firms should take into account income effects derived from their strategies. Also these firms should have market power in the labor market. These effects are completely ignored in the previous works. Our model avoids that by assuming a continuum of varieties and n firms producing each variety. Then firms have market-power on their single market but they are small enough to have any effect on aggregate outcomes.
Autarky
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L, with instantaneous logarithmic preferences defined over two final consumption goods x and y,
where C x t ,C y t represent consumption levels. Good y is an homogeneous good. 8 Good x is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite good defined in a continuum of industries of measure N:
where x jt represents consumption of good j. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labour at each point in time. In order to finance R&D activities, firms issue shares, A t , which pay a rate of return r t . Consumers are the owners of the firms and at time zero they receive an initial endowment of firms' shares A o that is equal across firms and across consumers. Let us take the homogeneous good as the numeraire (i.e. p y t = 1). The representative consumer budget constraint is given by:
where w t is the wage rate, and p jt is the price of good j. 9 Good y is produced by a continuum of firms of measure one with technology:
where L y t represents labour allocated to this sector. Sector y is competitive implying that w t = 1. 8 The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector without necessarily reducing labor assigned to composite good production. A similar result would arrive under the assumption of an elastic labor supply as in Aghion et al. (2001) but this alternative simplifies the model. Although important, the effect of trade openness on employment is not an issue in this paper.
9 Since entry is restricted firms have positive profits in equilibrium. Given that consumers own firms' shares, the standard asset value equation implies that r t V t = π +˙V. As we will see below, the market clearing condition of the financial assets implies that in equilibrium, LA t = nNV t , where
In steady state˙V = 0, and then r t A t = nN L π.Consequently, in equilibrium each consumer receives its own share of firms' profits through the term r t A t .
Each good j in x is produced by n firms in an oligopolistic environment. A firm i in j produces using technology (let us omit the subscript j for simplicity)
where z it is the stock of knowledge, which is assumed to be firm-specific. Firms in x can also invest in R&D activities leading to a reduction in marginal costs of production. The R&D technology iṡ
where L z it represents labor allocated to R&D. 10 At any point in time firms in j decide the quantity to supply and the optimal allocation of workers to both activities, production and R&D, taking into consideration other firms' strategies. This game belongs to the family of differential games, or repeated games defined in continuous time, in which past actions affect current payoffs. Two different concepts of Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the literature; the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. In an open-loop Nash equilibrium firms decide at time t = 0 the optimal path of strategies taking other firms' path of strategies as given. Instead, in a closed loop Nash equilibrium, firms decide at every period the optimal strategy taking as given the strategy of their opponents. Since our model fulfills the conditions for both types of equilibrium to coincide, we focus on open loop equilibria allowing us to apply standard optimal control theory techniques. 11 Let
iT are the timepaths of output and R&D workers, and let us call Ω i , the set of strategies of firm i. Let V i be the value of firm i when the n firms in the market, n ≥ 2, play strategies A n = a 1, a 2, ......., a n .
Definition 1. At time t, A n
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies a i maximizes the value of firm i taking as given other firms' strategies, (a −i ), and that the firm value has to be non-negative.
Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Consumers solve the standard optimal control problem defined above. The optimal conditions are
where E x t ,E y t are individual expenditures in goods x, y, respectively, i.e.,
and
In the following, we use the notation E t to refer indistinctly to the expenditure of good x or y. The price index of the composite good x is given by
Firm i producing good j solves the problem:
where γ ∈ (0,1), z i0 > 0 and R s,t = e − t s r τ dτ is the usual market discount factor. Obtaining the first order conditions, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, we get:
where v t is the costate associated with variable z t and θ ≡ n−1+α n is the inverse of the markup rate. We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria. In particular, we assume the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all firms in all sectors, i.e. z i0 = z 0 ∀i in all j.
The left hand side of condition (10) is the marginal gain of accumulating one more unit of knowledge, and it can be decomposed in two parts: the first one consists on the reduction in marginal production costs, where this gain is proportional to the quantity supplied by the firm, and the second one represents the learning by doing in research. Notice that the benefit of a cost-reduction innovation depends on firms' size, since it determines the amount of saved resources following such an innovation.
Given that the quantity produced determines the innovation effort, the way in which quantities are decided is fundamental for growth. This is in equation (8).
In particular, we are interested in understanding the effect of a change in the number of firms on the incentives to innovate. In our model, an increase in the number of firms generates two different, opposite forces. On the one hand, the market share of each firm reduces, which can be seen in the last term of condition (8), since l goes down. This is the size effect or the market share effect. On the other hand, the markup 1 θ depends positively on the perceived elasticity of demand n 1−α . The increase in n increases the perceived elasticity of demand and this gives firms the incentive to increase the quantity supplied in the market represented by the first term on the right hand side of (8). This is the competition effect.
The labor market clearing condition is
The financial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand LA t is equal to the stock market value of firms:
Finally, let us impose the market-clearing condition in sector Y:
Balanced growth path
In a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) equilibrium all variables are constant apart from q t ,z t ,v t and p t , which grow at constant rates. The following proposition shows the existence and uniqueness of a BGP.
Proposition 1. An interior BGP exists and is unique.
Proof. Combining (3), (8), (9) and (10), under˙L
Substituting the latter equation, (2), (4), (8), and (13) into the labor market-clearing condition (11), it becomes
Since f (.) is monotonically increasing, and satisfies the limit conditions lim x→0 f (x) = 0 and lim x→l f (x) > l, the existence and uniqueness is directly implied by the intermediate value theorem.
In Appendix B, we also show the economy jumps to its BGP at the initial time.
Output growth
In this economy, production in sectors Y and X do not grow at the same rate. Consistent with national accounts, let us define the growth rate by means of a Divisia index, meaning that the growth rate of real output is equal to the growth rate of both final sectors weighted by the share of each sector on nominal output. Since the homogeneous sector is not growing, and preferences are logarithmic, the growth rate of output is
Since technical progress only affects sector X, the growth rate of output depends only on the amount of labor allocated to research in this sector. θ is the inverse of the markup and it may be seen as a measure of the degree of competition. By differentiating (14) with respect to θ, the growth rate can be easily shown to be increasing in θ. This is what we have referred before as the competition effect. There is a positive relation between the degree of competition and the perceived elasticity of demand, which depends positively on both the number of firms n and the elasticity of substitution α. As we have commented before, an increase on θ leads firms to increase the quantity produced. Given that innovation can be exploited in a large number of produced units, firms increases innovation too. This result is the opposite to that found in monopolistic competitive models, where a rise in the elasticity of substitution decreases the markup and reduces the innovation rate. When incumbents carry out process innovation, the scale of operation becomes an important determinant of R&D decisions. The rise in the perceived elasticity of demand increases the quantity supplied and therefore the returns to innovation.
Free trade
Let us assume that countries are identical. Since both economies are equal in factor endowments and initial stocks of knowledge, no pattern of specialization from trade is observed and all the gains from trade come from an increase in competition.
Let us assume that transportation costs are of the iceberg type; precisely, (1 + τ) units of the product must be shipped in order to serve 1 unit abroad, where τ ≥ 0 is the percentage of total production that disappears in the process of shipping. Notice that for foreign firms selling in the domestic market, the markup in autarky has to be larger than the transportation costs, meaning that there is trade iff1+τ < 1 θ . Let us assume it in the next.
Under free trade, firms are able to serve both markets so some clarification about the notation must be made. Let us define the quantity q c ht as the quantity supplied by a firm located in country h to market c, where c,h ∈ {A, B}. That is q A Bt is the quantity supplied by the B-firm to the A-market. Whenever only one superscript appears, it indicates that the variable is defined for that economy, that is, E xA t would be the expenditure assigned to the good x by households located in country A.
Under symmetry, first order conditions for country A under free trade are:
Conditions (17), (18) are identical to conditions (9), (10) except from the fact that in (18), when computing the returns to innovation, firms take into account the quantity supplied in both markets. Conditions (15), (16) determine the optimal quantities supplied in each market and are analogous to condition (8), but one for each market. Notice that firms do not supply the same quantities to both markets. B-firms solve an identical problem and their first order conditions are equal to those of country A but changing the subscripts and the superscripts, from B to A and viceversa.
In order to complete the definition of an equilibrium allocation, the market clearing conditions need to be added: Proof. See Appendix A.
Balanced growth path
As shown in the appendix, the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to the following equation in L z :
which is in fact the same equation than in autarky but with θ * given by:
The question is whether the growth rate of technological progress is higher in free trade or, in another terms, whether θ * ≥ θ. Trade openness has no effect on the right hand side of (22) because neither local resources nor the local number of producers change. In other words, the increase in the number of competitors in each country has no size effect, since firms are selling in both countries. However, the increase in the number of competitors has an effect through competition. In the extreme case when τ = 0, the markup takes the same functional form as in autarky, but with 2n instead of n as the number of competitors doubles in each market. A reduction in markups puts the competition effect at work as already explained in the previous section. Even if firms are selling less in their domestic market in free trade as compared to autarky, the global quantity they supply is larger, because of the competition effect. Therefore, openness to international trade leads to more innovation and growth. Proposition 4 shows that the competition effect also works under trade frictions. It is important to notice that this result is not driven by any scale effect, since the number of workers per firm l is equal in both cases, under autarky and trade openness. All the effect is coming through the increase in the perceived elasticity of substitution as a consequence of an increase in the number of competitors. Now, we proceed to discuss some comparative statics.
Transportation costs are a barrier for foreign competitors reinforcing the market power of domestic firms and making the competition effect less effective, as shown in the proposition below.
Proposition 4. An increase in transportation costs has a negative impact on innovation efforts and productivity growth.
Proof. It can be easily shown by differentiating (23) with respect to τ. Finally, the difference between R&D investments in both regimes, autarky and free trade is smaller the larger the number of firms in each market in autarky. This is due to the fact that n has a non-linear impact on the quantity produced per firm; while for a small number of firms the increase in quantities due to trade openness is important, for a large number of firms it has a very small impact. The main mechanism operates through the perceived elasticity of demand and its effect on the markup; increasing the number of firms affects productivity growth through the inverse of the markup, whose derivative with respect to n decreases with n. Notice that there are no gains from trade in the extreme case of n ≥ 
Cournot vs. Bertrand
This section extends the results obtained in the paper to a more general framework in which we allow for different competition modes and we allow for a scenario in which producers offer heterogenous products. Peretto (2003) analyzes the growth effects of trade liberalization in an oligopolistic competition model where firms offers heterogeneous products and competeá la Bertrand. Here, we compare our model with a more general version of Peretto (2003) where we have a continuum of varieties and within each variety, several firms offer different varieties of the same product/variety (subvariety).
Consider the previous model where now, within each industry or product line j, each producer offers a different variety. Consumers have preferences defined over the different varieties of the product line given by the following functional form:
where the parameter β controls for the elasticity of substitution between subvarieties. Then consumers solve:
where the parameter α as in the original model controls for the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The product structure of this economy is as follows:
The output in the economy is the result of the production of several category of goods (here we sum up in two: Good X and Good Y). Within each category we have different product types (varieties) (for example taking the category of food we can have different types of food: meat, cheese, fish, etc... ) where we assume a certain degree of substitution between these varieties (the parameter α governs the elasticity of substitution between varieties). Within each variety we assume that each firm offers a different subvariety (i.e. a different type of cheese, or a different type of meat) where the parameter β controls for the degree of substitution between subvarieties. In what follows, we are going to assume that β > α or, the elasticity of substitution between varieties is lower than the elasticity of substitution between subvarieties. The solution of this problem gives the standard Euler equation, which is identical to the one of the original model, and the demand for each subvariety. The aggregate demand function for each subvariety is given by:
where P j is the aggregate price index of sector j (P jt = ) and P t is the aggregate price index of the economy (
. It should be noted that the demand price elasticity between subvarieties is given by ǫ = 1 1−β . It can be also shown that the demand price elasticity between product lines is given by ε = 1 1−α 12 . The aggregate inverse demand function for each subvariety is given by:
In Bertrand competition the firm chooses the price for its variety, considering that a change in its price may affect the quantity demanded. It is convenient to use the ordinary demand function for this. In particular, firm i in sector j solves the problem:
where γ ∈ (0,1), z ij0 > 0 and R s,t = e − t s r τ dτ is the usual market discount factor. Deriving the first order conditions for the Hamiltonian, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, we get:
One of the nice properties of the model is that you can sum up the effect of the different competition modes on innovation and growth through the effect on θ, where θ, the inverse of the mark-up, takes a different form under Bertrand and Cournot. In concrete, in Bertrand competition θ is given by the following expression:
whereas in Cournot competition θ is given by the following expression: θ c = β(n−1)+α n . Since the two models are completely isomorphic and they only differ in the parameter θ we can compare how both models behave differently with changes in exogenous parameters by looking at how different the parameter θ react to these changes in both models.
The first result to point out is that θ is increasing in n in both cases. Since when we open the economy, trade increases the number of local competitors within each local market, and that effect is in θ, both models incorporate in a very similar way the pro-competitive effect of trade openness. The Cournot case studied in detail in section 2 and below assumes that β = 1 whenever α can take any value between 0 and 1. Peretto (2003) instead. uses, in a similar environment, the Bertrand competition case with α = 0, and β varying between 0 and 1. In this section we study the more general case where the two parameters may take different values.
There are several important differences between the two set-ups which are worthy to mention. The first one characterizes the general result in the IO literature that competition in Bertrand is tougher than in Cournot. Empirical studies usually take mark-ups as a measure of the degree of competition in an industry. In our model θ is the inverse of the mark-up so as θ increases, mark-ups fall and competition increases. Proposition 6 in the appendix shows that θ is larger in Bertrand as compared to Cournot, and therefore, for the same number of firms, competition is tougher in a Bertrand scenario. According to the results of this paper, industries characterized by Bertrand competition should innovate more than industries characterized by Cournot competition.
The second one, which is already more important, relates the effect of trade openness on innovation and growth under both set-ups. Proposition 7 reveals that an increase in the number of firms increases θ by more in a Cournot industry than in a Bertrand industry. Since trade openness basically increases the mass of competitors in each market, we can conclude that free trade has a larger impact on innovation and productivity growth in an industry characterized by Cournot competition as compared to one characterized by Bertrand competition. The competition mode becomes relevant for quantitative purposes, as free trade will push innovation further in Cournot industries than in Bertrand industries.
To see more differences between both competition modes we have plotted below how our measure of competition θ changes with trade openness in both setups, Cournot and Bertrand, for a large rank of parameter values. The figure 1 shows the increase underwent in teta when the economy is open to free trade under different values for the parameters α and β and the number of firms for the case of Bertrand competition while figure 2 shows the same for the case of Cournot competition. The parameter α was fixed to 0.2 without loss of generalization allowing for a very low substitutability across varieties. The parameter β, was let to take any value between 0.2 and 1 (remember that this parameter must be larger than α reflecting that subvarieties are more substitutes each other than varieties are). The number of firms was let to take values from 2 to 10 allowing for a big rank of competition degrees. A first look into the figures reveal an important difference between both set-ups: As subvarieties become more and more substitutes, the gains from trade vanishes in the Bertrand set-up. While in the case of Cournot competition, the more substitute the subvarieties are, the larger the gains from trade (Proposition 8 in the appendix), the results are quite different when we allow for Bertrand competition. In the latter, an increase in the elasticity of substitution increases the difference in competition between both scenarios (autarky and free trade) but only for low values of this parameter. When subvarieties become close substitutes an increase in the elasticity of substitution in the Bertrand set-up reduces clearly this difference and therefore the gains from trade. In the limit case, when the subvarieties are perfect substitutes, the gains from trade become zero. Unlike Bertrand, the gains from trade under Cournot competition when the subvarieties are perfect substitutes are the largest.
Both models are coincident on the result established in the previous section: The gains from trade are larger the lower is the number of firms in each country in autarky and it vanishes when the number of firms within each local market is high enough. However, both models differ on "the speed of vanishment". Figure 1 shows that with more than four firms, the gains in the Bertrand set-up vanishes even if the elasticity of substitution is not closed to one. On the contrary, in the Cournot set-up the gains from trade are relatively large for high values of the elasticity of substitution β. This suggests that for the Bertrand model to get a non-negligible impact of trade on innovation and growth through this channel we should assume very few firms offering products which are not close substitutes. But this is something difficult to assume. As long as we consider more disaggregated level of classification for industries, we expect that the varieties offered in the market become closer substitutes.
The case of trade barriers /transportation costs is analogous. It is important to mention, however, that when subvarieties are perfect substitutes, no trade is observed in equilibrium when firms competeá la Bertrand. This just follows from the fact that the Nash equilibrium in autarky is to fix p t = z −1 t . When the economy opens to trade, the existence of trade barriers makes more expensive to serve the foreign market. Foreign firms cannot compete with the local firms, whose marginal cost of serving their local market is lower, and therefore they export zero at equilibrium.
To sum up, Bertrand competition gives little role to the pro-competitive effect of trade on innovation and growth when the subvarieties are close substitutes, or when we have very few firms. Moreover, in the limit case, if subvarieties are perfect substitutes no intra-industry trade should be observed across countries in the Bertrand set-up. Intra-industry trade however is a phenomenon concentrated in developed countries, which accounts for the majority of the volume of trade flows throughout the world (UNCTAD, 2005) . One should expect that those countries share similar industry characteristics, as we have assumed throughout the whole paper, and trade occurs between producers offering similar varieties, or closer substitutes of the same products. In that environment, Cournot competition appears to be a more useful framework to approach this phenomenon than Bertrand competition.
Conclusions
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with firm specific innovation, Cournot competition on a continuum of oligopolistic markets and free trade between identical economies. It shows that international trade induces growth in participant countries through an increase in competition; openness to trade generates a reduction in markups, inducing firms to innovate more to profit from the associated increase in market size. This research reinforces the view that at least for the case of developed countries trade openness enhances innovation and growth through a pro-competitive effect. Unlike the early endogenous growth literature this paper predicts a positive impact of trade on innovation and growth due to an increase in competition, and this is due to the assumptions of: vertical innovation and oligopolistic competition. Different from other oligopolistic competition models, our framework advocates clearly for free trade: As compared to Bertrand, under Cournot competition, the effect of trade on innovation is larger. Moreover under Cournot competition, the effect is larger for higher elasticities of substitution between different varieties of a certain product line. For the case of firms offering similar products, our model predicts that trade volumes are non-negligible across countries and that trade has a relevant impact on productivity and growth. On the other hand, if we assume that in this particular case firms competeá la Bertrand the model predicts that trade volumes are low, and therefore the impact of trade liberalization on competition and growth is negligible.
By restricting the analysis to identical economies, the present paper may be seen as a contribution to the understanding of the growth effect of regional integration agreements among similar countries, as it is the case of France and Germany in the European Union. A natural extension would be the case of economies starting with different initial conditions (i.e. different technological levels) or different factor endowments (i.e. population). This would make possible the study of the interaction between developed and developing economies, as it is the case of Mexico and the US in NAFTA or the accession of Ireland and Spain to the EU. Differences in the initial stock of knowledge determine the initial differences in marginal costs and market shares; differences in market size depend upon differences in population, as standard in these models The pro-competitive effect of trade in both economies will be determined by the interaction of these two forces.
Another interesting extension would allow for different trade policies. In the paper we have studied the standard case of bilateral trade policies. However, unilateral trade policies and other preferential trade liberalization agreements has becoming more and more important in recent years (Holmes and James A. Schmitz (2010) ). For the case of unilateral trade policies, we expect a reduction of growth rates in the liberalizing country since the positive effect of the increase in competition on innovation coming from this policy is more than offset by the creation of an artificial comparative advantage to foreign firms. However, preferential trade liberalization agreements will enhance growth in the liberalizing countries while reducing growth in protectionist third countries due to the fact that the reduction of trade barriers between the two liberalizing countries increases competitiveness of their firms in both economies with respect to third country firms. 13 Another direction for future research would explore how sectorial differences in competition may affect the effect of trade openness on innovation and growth. In this case, it would be possible to identify sectors having larger gains from trade. Considering, for simplicity, intersectorial independence, we suspect that the less competitive sectors will have the largest gains from trade. 13 Preferential trade liberalization agreements reduce trade barriers between two economies, but it does not alter the symmetry properties of firms in both countries. In this case market shares of the firms of both countries increase fostering innovation and creating a comparative advantage over a third protectionist country. These results are complementary to those derived in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in which unilateral and preferential trade agreements were having similar effects on industry aggregate productivity in a static framework.
A Free Trade
Proposition 3 Under τ ≤ 1−α n−1+α , a balanced growth path exists and is unique.
q t , for all t. Proof. Under symmetry, z A t = z B t = z t , q A At = q B Bt = q t and q B At = q A Bt =T aking condition (15) for both countries, we get (n − 1 + α)q t + nq t nq t + (n − 1 + α)q t = 1 1 + τ ,
which requires τ ≤ 1 − α n − 1 + α to q andq be simultaneously positive.
Under symmetry, E xA t = E xB t = E t , P A t = P B t = P t and p jt = p t for all j and t, implying that the inverse demand function (6) for any variety produced in any country becomes p t = LE n(q t +q t ) 1−α P t = lE q t +q t , the last equality follows from the definition of the price index P. Substituting the latter condition and (25) in (15) and rearranging terms, it follows
q t = ((1 − α)(1 + τ) − nτ)(2n − 1 + α) n(2 + τ) 2 (1 − α) z t lE.
At the balanced growth path, r t = ρ from (5), and˙z z = (L z ) γ from (3). From (17), (18), (26) and (27), we obtain:
where, by analogy with the autarky case, θ * = (2n − 1 + α)(2(1 − α)(1 + τ) + τ 2 (1 − α − n)) n(2 + τ) 2 (1 − α) .
From the labor market clearing condition (19),
From (21) and (4), L y = LE; from (2), q + (1 + τ)q = zL x . Substitution q andq by their expressions in (26) and (27), we get
i.e., is the same equation as in the autarkic model but with θ * instead of θ. Interiority and uniqueness of the solution is therefore ensured by looking at the autarkic balanced growth path proof.
Proposition 4 Under τ ≤ 1−α n−1+α , θ * ≥ θ. Proof. From the definition of θ * and θ, θ * − θ = (2n − 1 + α)(2(1 − α)(1 + τ) + τ 2 (1 − α − n)) n(2 + τ) 2 (1 − α)
It can be easily shown that the r.h.s. is decreasing in τ, with θ * − θ = 0 when τ is at its maximum value 1−α n−1+α .
B Cournot vs. Bertrand
Proposition 5. 
C Stability analysis under autarky
Let us combine equations (2), (8) and (11) to get
